A million seconds is 12 days.
A billion seconds is 32 years.
As previously stated in Part I of this series, the manipulation of economic reality starts with the desire to maintain the status quo. In Part II we had a glance at debt bubbles and related issues. Let us complete Part III with a quick look at statistical fiddling, ‘bubble’ trouble and a U.S. Central Bank policy.
Let us examine just a few tricks used by governments to ‘massage’ employment statistics:
(1) Disabled people are generally not included in the employment statistics. Anyone
collecting various forms of disability payments is usually excluded from the official employment
statistics. This is a common practice in the USA;
(2) EU citizens working abroad due to a lack of jobs within the EU are generally not counted
as ‘unemployed’ by the EU;
(3) Underemployed people are not counted in the unemployment statistics;
(4) Workers involved in ‘busywork’ programs funded by the government are generally shown to
be ‘employed’ by statistics;
(5) Self-employed people that barely make a few euros, or dollars, a day are counted as
employed;
(6) Refugees and asylum-seekers are generally paid out of a different fund and hence don’t
count as unemployed (usually);
(7) In the USA, graduating students from secondary school or university who have never held a
job are not counted in the unemployment data. Indeed, they are generally ineligible for
unemployment benefits since they were never part of the labor market in the first place (A
minimum of 26 weeks of work contributions is the basic prerequisite to qualify for benefits);
(8) Unemployed people who die may be counted as having gained employment, thus falsely
bolstering the employment data – statistically speaking, that is.
On a similar note, it is estimated that approximately four-hundred thousand unemployed Americans dropped from the unemployment rolls in July 2010. These were Americans who had already reached their 99-week limit of unemployment benefits and were not entitled to an additional payment even though President Obama extended unemployment benefits. Once the cumulative 99-week limit is reached an unemployed person is cut off! Cutting these people does wonders for ‘massaging’ the unemployment statistics. Most western economies are not creating significant employment.
Now let us quickly examine a few ways to alter GDP and inflation numbers via ‘official’manipulation:
(1) Reflation using stimulus money - a common practice in the USA. In short, the Government
hands out money and counts the spending of that money as growth. This allegedly increases the
money supply for everyone and may skew ‘growth’ statistics towards the positive side. However,
there’s debt and no real productivity. Governments borrow and spend money. In the EU, buying of
government debt by the ECB and establishing ‘liquidity solutions’ functions in a similar way to
‘stabilize’ the economy and increase the money supply over time. Debt bubbles begin inflating;
(2) Using a geometric average rather than simple arithmetic average will drop a consumer
price index by 1% depending upon the items measured. This keeps inflation ‘in check’ thus
massaging inflation figures downwards in order to ‘prove’ a deflationary situation;
(3) Claiming ‘growth’ when in fact the alleged ‘growth’ is actually due to a large drop off
in imports into a given country. People buy less imports and it looks as if the balance of trade
has shifted in favor of the country in the form of so-called growth. Said ‘growth’ is then
alleged to have created ‘jobs’;
(4) GDP can be boosted by insurance companies increasing premiums upon clients. For example,
a health care insurer in California recently announced a 15% rate increase. If such increases
were excluded from U.S. figures, the GDP numbers would be somewhat less than shown.
Increases in insurance premiums actually count in a country’s GDP. Of course, the average person generally does not benefit from paying more. This is an insidious way to increase GDP.
The aforementioned is pretty basic material. Let us delve a bit deeper.
THE MERRY OLD LAND OF OZ…
The ‘formula’ determining recession or depression is not the same beast as it was back in the 1930’s. The formula in use today allows for adjustments that show ‘recession’ instead of a ‘depression’. For instance, when today’s formula is applied to the numbers from the Great Depression, the ‘depression’ turns into a ‘recession’ - seasonally adjusted, leaving out food and fuel, etc. Real unemployment is well over 20%. The soup lines of old are now replaced by various social benefit programs in the West, such as the Food Stamp Program in the USA. Smoke and mirrors.
It is interesting to note that one of America’s largest retailers - Wal-Mart - increased prices up to 65% on various items, such as oatmeal, in the past several months. A variety of non-food items also showed significant increases in price. This is not typical of a deflationary environment. Prices are jumping on various essentials such as food, yet we are told by the great watchers of our global economic system that deflation may be looming. Deflation or inflation? Both - an unseemly mix.
Why may food prices be on the rise in the USA?
With over 40 million Americans now participating in the USDA Food Stamp program (and another 4-5
million projected to be added onto the rolls by next year) there appears little incentive for grocers to reduce prices. Why? The Government is increasingly footing the bill! It appears that a social welfare program is thus utilized as a type of an indirect corporate bailout.
Next, should the world worry if the US, and other nations, resorts to seemingly endless‘Quantitative Easing’? Let us have a look.
Fed Follies
According to various sources, the US M3 money supply plunged at a 1930’s pace earlier this year. Why? The US Government beats around the bush when this query arises. Here’s one answer - Most banks, various corporations, and many individuals, are hoarding cash. Bailout funds were being used for investment purposes other than origination of consumer loans. This situation has thus provided the impetus for another round of Quantitative Easing (QE2).
Let us glance at the thought processes behind this policy.
According to US Federal Reserve Chairman, Mr Ben Bernanke, in some comments on the Great Depression from a 2004 speech, "Hoarding [of money] effectively removed money from circulation, adding further to the deflationary pressures. Moreover, as I emphasized in early research of my own (Bernanke, 1983), the virtual shutting down of the U.S. banking system also deprived the economy of an important source of credit and other services normally provided by banks.”
Given the aforementioned reasoning, it must be a good idea for the Fed to pump even more ‘liquidity’ into the system? Let’s see.
Here's an excerpt from "The Liquidity Trap and U.S. Interest Rates in the 1930s" (Christopher Hanes, 1 Feb 2006; Journal of Money, Credit & Banking) that appears to have some relevancy to the current US Federal Reserve policies:
“Recent experience of low inflation has revived interest in the liquidity trap, ‘a situation in
which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at
or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect’ (Krugman 1998, p. 141).
Many discussions of the liquidity trap argue (or assume) that it constrains a central bank's
ability to control interest rates at any maturity as soon as interest rates have been pushed to
zero at the shortest maturity--in modern financial markets, the overnight maturity. Monetary
policy may still be able to influence real activity through exchange rates (Orphanides and
Wieland, 2000, Svensson, 2000, McCallum, 2001) or effects of money balances on demand for assets
in general, including durable goods (Brunner and Meltzer, 1968a, Meltzer, 2001). But the
"interest rate channel" of monetary policy--special influence over yields on liquid assets, and
hence on required returns for less liquid financial assets such as bank loans--is blocked. In the
common view, a central bank cannot affect term premiums unless it can "twist" the yield curve by
changing the maturity structure of outstanding government debt, which is doubtful (Johnson,
Small, and Tryon, 1999, King, 1999, Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, pp. 20-23). Thus, a central
bank influences longer-term rates only through expectations of future overnight rates. Once
overnight rates have been driven to their floor, a central bank has no reliable mechanism to
validate, or contradict, these expectations…On this definition, the United States was in a
liquidity trap through most of the 1930s. According to Krugman (1998), U.S. interest rates were
‘hard up against the zero constraint’ (p. 137).”
Mr Hanes goes on to state, “In the 1930s, bankers complained that low interest rates weakened
their capital positions by reducing earnings (Meltzer 2003, p. 548), while a banker observed: ‘We
are vitally interested in protecting our capital funds from depreciation when the ultimate
increase in interest rates comes and brings along a depreciation in longer-term securities’ (p.
507).”
The article is much lengthier and very intriguing. As may be extrapolated from Mr Hanes' 2006 article, a few problems may exist with the Fed's current 21st century policy. Time will tell.
Are There Still Potential Security Gaps in the U.S. Financial System?
There appears to be a slow move afoot to create easier mortgage financing in the USA. Credit Unions usually restrict membership to certain types of people (e.g., public employees, farmers and so on). However, some credit unions are advertising nationally in various newspapers regarding mortgage offerings to the general public if they ‘donate’ to a foundation in order to ‘qualify’ said member of the general public for membership in a restricted credit union. This serves to expand the membership. An expanded membership increases the likelihood of an increase in an ‘asset’ base when the extra members originate loans. Loans are counted as assets by the credit unions. A credit union may show positive growth for awhile during this process. However, once the newly added members begin to default - the party begins to wane.
Such ‘relaxed’ guidelines are popping up all over the USA with little fanfare (for obvious reasons). Credit unions in the USA are offering jumbo adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM’s) set to adjust a few years from now. Many US credit unions avoided the fiscal calamities of the past few years. Will this change as time drags on?
Does the U.S. Government know of the apparently ‘relaxed’ guidelines that may potentially foster conditions of the sale of a portion of the millions of distressed properties? A possibility for increasing housing prices and also the derivatives based upon said ‘distressed’ properties may occur should unscrupulous buyers get back into the real estate market en masse. Such a scenario sets the world up for a huge crash in the not too distant future. Is a new bubble being ‘inadvertently’ set up by some US financial institutions?
The Sum of All Things
Please recall from Part I that the Golden Ratio is a unique number approximately equal to 1.618. The inverse of the Golden Ratio is approximately 0.618 (i.e., 61.8%). In the book “America's Great Depression” by Murray Rothbard (1963), a more encompassing, and accurate, measure of the money supply that included currency, demand and time deposits, savings-and-loan shares and the cash value of life-insurance policies was employed than the measurements utilized by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their book entitled “Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960” (1963). Using the more all-encompassing Rothbard figures, the money supply increased by the Golden Ratio number of 61.8% between 1921 and 1929, with an average annual increase of 7.7%. Various credible sources state that the U.S. money supply fell approximately one-third between 1929 and 1933. Approximately one-third? What a peculiar retracement.
Bel! Mort!
An ending begins,
A beginning ends;
Saw a curve,
It bends!
P.S. To be more precise, it takes 31.688 years for a billion seconds
to elapse when leap years are taken into account (but it rounds up to 32).
Other References:

The Golden Ratio Revisited – Part II
“We will not have any more crashes in our time.”
-John Maynard Keynes, 1927